Chapter 26 · Security: Authentication, Authorization, Roles, TLS, and Secrets
Roles, LOGIN, Permissions, GRANT / REVOKE, Role Inheritance, and Least Privilege
Design inherited least-privilege roles and prove allowed/denied CQL.
Learning outcomes
AtlasMart's API, support users and platform automation need
different capabilities. Granting broad
ALL permissions because identities are “inside the
private network” turns one credential compromise into a
cluster-wide incident.
Separate LOGIN identities from LOGIN=false entitlement roles.
Grant SELECT/MODIFY at the narrowest useful Cassandra resource.
Use role inheritance and LIST ROLES/PERMISSIONS as evidence.
Prove GRANT/REVOKE behavior and understand authorization caches.
Explain permission-granularity boundaries plus network/CIDR authorization layers.
The mandatory work uses a separate disposable security cluster
so hardening experiments cannot lock the shared course
cluster. Pin Apache Cassandra 5.0.9 with the
official cassandra:5.0.9 image, Java 17 from that
image, Docker network
atlasmart-cassandra-security, cluster
atlasmart-security, nodes
atlasmart-sec-1..3, datacenter dc1,
racks rack1..rack3, 16 virtual nodes (vnodes) per
node, NetworkTopologyStrategy, replication factor
(RF) 3, and LOCAL_QUORUM for application-style
verification. Tables use UnifiedCompactionStrategy (UCS),
default_time_to_live=0, and
gc_grace_seconds=864000.
The lab intentionally starts with Cassandra's compatible
security defaults so the migration is observable:
AllowAllAuthenticator,
AllowAllAuthorizer, client TLS disabled,
internode encryption none, and JMX local-only. No
Cassandra/JMX/storage ports are published to the host. This is
a local learning boundary, not a production posture. Never
place a real password, token, private key, keystore password,
backup key, or break-glass credential into Git, lesson HTML,
screenshots, chat, shell history, or process arguments.
Run commands only against the disposable Apache Cassandra course lab or another explicitly approved non-production environment. Confirm node, keyspace, table, container, volume, path, and datacenter targets before destructive, failure-injection, cleanup, repair, restore, security, or topology operations. Capture current state and expected rollback/recovery evidence first; output and timings can differ by host, operating system, Java runtime, Docker/runtime, driver, and Cassandra configuration.
Terms before the security mechanisms
CQL is Cassandra Query Language. A coordinator is the node accepting a client request; replicas store copies of the target partition. A partition is the row group located by a partition key; its hash maps to a token. vnodes are multiple token ranges assigned per node. A keyspace defines replication. RF is replication factor and CL is consistency level. An SSTable is Cassandra's immutable on-disk table file set; compaction merges SSTables; repair compares replica ranges and streams differences. SAI is Storage-Attached Indexing. A driver is the client library speaking Cassandra's native protocol.
Authentication proves an identity; Cassandra's
authenticator implements that decision.
Authorization decides what an authenticated
identity may do; the authorizer checks
permissions on Cassandra resources. A role is
Cassandra's principal/inheritance object;
LOGIN=true makes it directly authenticatable. A
superuser bypasses normal authorization and
therefore belongs only in tightly controlled administration or
break-glass recovery. Least privilege grants
only the permissions needed.
TLS (Transport Layer Security) protects network
traffic and authenticates endpoints with certificates.
Client TLS protects application/cqlsh ↔
Cassandra native protocol;
internode TLS protects Cassandra node ↔ node
gossip/replication/streaming. mTLS (mutual TLS)
means both sides present certificates. A
keystore holds private key/certificate material
and a truststore holds trust anchors.
JMX (Java Management Extensions) is Cassandra's
management interface used by nodetool.
Defense in depth layers identity, permissions,
encryption, network isolation, secrets, backups, audit, patching
and recovery instead of trusting one control.
1. Role inheritance is a permission graph
| Role | LOGIN | Permission | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| atlasmart_order_reader | false | SELECT table | reusable entitlement |
| atlasmart_order_writer | false | MODIFY table | reusable entitlement |
| atlasmart_api | true | reader + writer | application identity |
| atlasmart_support | true | reader only | human support |
| atlasmart_breakglass | true | SUPERUSER | emergency administration |
Role inheritance is transitive and Cassandra prevents cyclic
role membership. Keeping permission bundles as non-login roles
makes reviews clearer and separates credential lifecycle from
entitlement lifecycle. Cassandra permissions remain
resource-oriented, not arbitrary row/column business logic;
table MODIFY is broader than “update status only.”
2. Create least-privilege roles
CREATE ROLE IF NOT EXISTS atlasmart_order_reader WITH LOGIN=false AND SUPERUSER=false;CREATE ROLE IF NOT EXISTS atlasmart_order_writer WITH LOGIN=false AND SUPERUSER=false;GRANT SELECT ON TABLE atlasmart_secure.orders_by_customer TO atlasmart_order_reader;GRANT MODIFY ON TABLE atlasmart_secure.orders_by_customer TO atlasmart_order_writer;-- Create login roles with hashes generated by hash_password; do not use these placeholders literally.CREATE ROLE IF NOT EXISTS atlasmart_apiWITH LOGIN=true AND SUPERUSER=false AND HASHED PASSWORD='<GENERATED_HASH>';CREATE ROLE IF NOT EXISTS atlasmart_supportWITH LOGIN=true AND SUPERUSER=false AND HASHED PASSWORD='<GENERATED_HASH>';GRANT atlasmart_order_reader TO atlasmart_api;GRANT atlasmart_order_writer TO atlasmart_api;GRANT atlasmart_order_reader TO atlasmart_support;LIST ROLES;LIST ALL PERMISSIONS OF atlasmart_api;LIST ALL PERMISSIONS OF atlasmart_support;
Generate distinct secrets/hashes using Lesson 1's temporary-file workflow. Capture only role/resource/permission fields needed for audit evidence; do not publish hashes unnecessarily and never publish the plaintext credentials.
3. Prove allowed and denied operations
identity SELECT orders UPDATE orders schema administrationatlasmart_api ALLOW ALLOW DENYatlasmart_support ALLOW DENY DENYbreak-glass ALLOW ALLOW emergency-only ALLOW
docker exec -it atlasmart-sec-1 cqlsh -u atlasmart_support --disable-history# Inside cqlsh:# CONSISTENCY LOCAL_QUORUM;# SELECT status,total FROM atlasmart_secure.orders_by_customer# WHERE customer_id='cust-42' AND order_month='2026-09-01';# Then try the following mutation; it should return Unauthorized:# UPDATE atlasmart_secure.orders_by_customer SET status='CANCELLED'# WHERE customer_id='cust-42' AND order_month='2026-09-01'# AND order_time='2026-09-08T10:00:00Z'# AND order_id=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000261;
The credential can then cross unrelated data and administrative boundaries. Repair by granting only required resource/action combinations and adding negative tests to deployment/security reviews. Network privacy cannot compensate for excessive authorization.
4. Revoke, observe, and restore
REVOKE atlasmart_order_writer FROM atlasmart_api;LIST ALL PERMISSIONS OF atlasmart_api;-- Verify mutation denial in a fresh session and observe an existing session as well.GRANT atlasmart_order_writer TO atlasmart_api;LIST ALL PERMISSIONS OF atlasmart_api;
Roles and permissions are cached. The authoritative revoke can
be observed on a schedule influenced by
roles_validity and
permissions_validity. Security incident runbooks
must test fresh and existing sessions rather than promise
instant revocation without evidence.
5. Network/DC/CIDR authorization adds, not replaces, layers
Cassandra 5.0 also provides
CassandraNetworkAuthorizer for datacenter access
restrictions and CassandraCIDRAuthorizer for
CIDR-group restrictions. When enabled, their state also depends
on system_auth. The mandatory one-DC Docker lab
leaves them disabled because it cannot reproduce a real
enterprise perimeter; use infrastructure
firewall/service-mesh/security-group controls plus Cassandra
resource permissions and, where suitable, network/CIDR
authorization.
Check your understanding
- Why use LOGIN=false group roles?
- Why is table MODIFY not a full business-policy boundary?
- What does LIST ALL PERMISSIONS prove?
- Why test existing sessions after revoke?
- What do network/CIDR authorizers add?
Review the answers
1. They separate reusable entitlements from credentials.
2. It cannot express arbitrary row/field/workflow invariants.
3. The Cassandra permission graph for that role, not TLS/network/secret controls.
4. Authorization caching can affect when the changed decision is observed.
5. DC/CIDR restrictions that complement resource authorization and infrastructure policy.
Production judgment
Security controls affect latency, availability and operator skill. Record Cassandra/JVM/driver versions, DC/racks/RF/CL, auth/TLS/JMX/network state, role inheritance, credential/certificate expiry, audit retention, backup encryption/access, patch status, repair/restore credentials and the application routing/retry/idempotency model. Re-run p50/p95/p99 latency and replica-failure tests after encryption/authorization changes. Data modeling still matters: partition/cardinality/TTL/tombstone/compaction/repair/SAI/vector choices can change sensitive-data exposure and resource-denial risk.
Do not treat a private subnet, one superuser password, client TLS or one audit stream as sufficient. Managed Cassandra may operate some server certificates, JMX, upgrades or backups, but application identities, permissions, client trust, data classification, secret use and incident response still have explicit owners. Migration/rollback must retain a tested administrative path and prevent coordinator-dependent security drift. Lesson 3 protects network confidentiality/integrity and proves client TLS and internode TLS are separate mechanisms.
Summary and next step
This lesson’s concepts, evidence path, failure boundaries, and production judgment should now be explicit enough to verify rather than assume. Re-run the check-your-understanding prompts and preserve any lab evidence you need before changing or cleaning up the environment.
Next, continue to Internode Encryption vs Client TLS: Certificates, Trust, Rotation, and Failure Modes.
Authoritative references
Security defaults, algorithms, tooling and deprecations are version-sensitive. Re-check the target Cassandra/JVM/driver distribution and organizational cryptographic policy before production rollout.